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FUELED BY FREE TRADE: WTO TRADE
AGREEMENTS ENSURING THE PROLIFERATION
OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY
JOHN FERRISS*
INTRODUCTION
The demand for renewable energy, particularly wind and solar
power, has seen a meteoric rise in the last decade. In the United States,
solar energy capacity increased at a rate of forty percent per year from
2000 to 2008.1 In 2008 alone, for example, the solar capacity in the United
States expanded to 9,813 megawatts (“MW”), a total increase in excess
of sixteen percent.2 While this still meant that solar energy only provided
about 0.1% of the nation’s electricity, the Department of Energy predicted
that this could grow to ten percent by the year 2025.3 A study by the Inter-
national Energy Agency in 2011 estimated that the world could derive a
third of its electricity from the sun by 2060.4
Germany has increased its solar capacity to 18 million MW in 2011,
capable of powering 5.1 million homes.5 China has become a world leader
in manufacturing photovoltaic panels, having increased its manufactur-
ing by a factor of four between 2009 and 2011.6 These numbers indicate
a clear desire worldwide to maximize output from renewable energy.
This increase in demand, however, has resulted in fairly frequent
trade disputes between nations seeking to expand or preserve their
* J.D. Candidate 2015, William & Mary Law School; B.A. 2008, Bowdoin College.
1 Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Study: Solar Power Could Provide 10%
of U.S. Electricity by 2025, EERE NETWORK NEWS (June 25, 2008), http://apps1.eere.energy
.gov/news/news_detail.cfm/news_id=11835, archived at http://perma.cc/DDX9-Q3D3.
2 Solar Energy Industries Association, US Solar Industry in Review, 2008, available at
http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/us-solar-industry-year-in-review-2008-120627092759
-phpapp01.pdf.
3 Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, supra note 1.
4 Ben Sills, IEA Says Solar May Provide a Third of Global Energy by 2060, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-02/iea-says-solar-may
-provide-a-third-of-global-energy-by-2060.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9TTT-26FQ.
5 German Solar Power Output Up 60 Pct In 2011, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2011/12/29/germany-solar-idAFL6E7NT1WK20111229?sp=true,
archived at http://perma.cc/U9V3-Y3Z9.
6 Chinese Solar Industry Gears up Following EU-China Deal, CRI (Aug. 6, 2013) http://
english.cri.cn/11354/2013/08/06/2361s780295.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/YH5D-3KCF.
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country’s green industries. The European Union (“EU”) accused the
Chinese solar panel industry of dumping, or selling its products at prices
below what they would charge domestically.7 After the EU threatened to
impose heavy anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels, represen-
tatives from both countries met, and agreed to set a minimum price and a
quota for exports.8 But this is one example, and, for the purposes of this
Note, not a demonstrative one given how the countries resolved the
matter themselves.
Since the beginning of this decade, there have been seven cases
brought to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) concerning members’
measures, subsidies, or restrictions on trade in renewable energy technol-
ogy and resources, not counting bio-diesel cases.9 Thus, with an average
of over two cases per year, green technology is a rather contentious indus-
try as well as an in-demand commodity. Of course, the WTO, whose mis-
sion is to encourage the freest trade conditions possible among nations,
is the appropriate forum to address such disputes.
This Note will focus on two such cases that illustrate some of the
different disputes that can arise in the international trade of green tech-
nology. For example, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission
was inaugurated in 2010 as part of a long-term plan to develop India’s
use of solar energy.10 The goal is to have a solar capacity of 1,000 MW by
the end of this year, with more over the next eleven years.11 However, the
new program requires that contractors derive a large portion of their
material from domestic manufacturers.12 In response to these measures,
the United States has filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (“DSB”),13 which was created under the WTO Dispute Settlement
7 Chinese Solar Industry Gears up Following EU-China Deal, supra note 6.
8 Id.
9 Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english
/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/W5K2-VFEG (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015).
10 Sujay Mehdudia, Manmohan Singh Launches ‘Solar India’, HINDU (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/12/stories/2010011260911100.htm, archived at http://perma
.cc/ZCR7-F54F.
11 Id.
12 MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, MIN. OF INDIA, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL
SOLAR MISSION GUIDELINES FOR SELECTION OF NEW GRID CONNECTED SOLAR POWER PROJ-
ECTS, BATCH II 7–8 (2011), available at http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/jnnsm
_gridconnected_24082011.pdf.
13 Request for Consultations by the United States, India—Certain Measures Relating to
Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 6, 2013).
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Understanding.14 The United States alleges that India’s measures violate
Article XXII of the GATT 1994, Article 8 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (“TRIMS”), and Articles 4, 7, and 30 of the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”).15
In May of 2012, China requested consultations with the United
States, accusing the United States of improperly imposing countervailing
duties on Chinese exports, including solar panels.16 Specifically, the Chi-
nese government claims that the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”)
incorrectly designated the exporters of these products as “public bodies”
and as such are susceptible to countervailing duties.17 According to China,
this violates Articles 1, 2, 11, and 14 of the SCM Agreement.18
As consultations failed to reach any resolution, both of these cases
have assembled panels to adjudicate the respective matters.19 These two
cases cover two separate areas of international trade law; their only
common characteristic is that the traded goods in question include solar
technology. The case between the United Sates and India (known as
India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules) deals
with national treatment, which is when a nation passes laws, regulations,
or taxes that favor domestic products over imports.20 The dispute between
the United States and China (US—Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China) deals with countervailing duties, which are
taxes that an importing country will apply to products that the exporting
country has subsidized to make cheaper than domestic products.21 This
Note will elaborate on both national treatment and countervailing duties
below. The differences illustrate how solar technology can become in-
volved in various types of trade disputes.
This Note will explore the course of these trade disputes and pre-
dict the outcome in light of the relevant international trade laws. After ana-
lyzing these disputes and presumed outcomes, the answer as to whether
14 See generally Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/C8CX-YPRM (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
15 Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 13.
16 Request for Consultations by China, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/1 (May 25, 2012).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 9.
20 DANIEL C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 142–43 (Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum eds., 2nd
ed. 2013) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
21 Id. at 443–44.
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current international trade agreements impede the proliferation of sus-
tainable technology overseas will likely be no. WTO trade obligations are
meant to ensure the freest trade conditions possible for all commodities,
including green technology equipment.
Despite countries trying to protect nascent green industries, the
reality of the global market will ensure that new trade agreements will
facilitate the spread of green technologies worldwide, just as countries
have previously raised the curtain on other technologies (i.e., allowing
countries with comparative advantage in manufacturing renewable en-
ergy technology to trade freely, the fact that China manufactures so much
of the world’s electronics being one example). The end result of this will
mean the extensive proliferation of solar technology worldwide with the
least interference from non-market forces.
The first section of this Note will describe the WTO Dispute
Settlement process and set the background for green technology disputes,
including the relevant substantive terms governing disputes. The second
section will discuss the case concerning the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Solar Mission, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules, including the contested trade provisions. The third section will
then cover US—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, including an examination of the provisions brought into question.
The fourth section will then predict the outcome of these cases, looking
to prior DSU cases that addressed these measures.
I. BACKGROUND:
A. Origins of Trade Disputes
A WTO dispute arises when one member (a country, as WTO
membership is limited to signatory nations) believes that another has
adopted policies that violate international trade terms to which both coun-
tries voluntarily agreed.22 The motivations for such breaches vary on a case
by case basis, but they generally fall under the category of protectionism,
that is, trying to protect domestic industries from foreign competition.23
Two protectionist motivations appear relevant to the two cases in question.
22 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, archived at http://perma.cc
/9MGW-RBKP [hereinafter A Unique Contribution].
23 Protectionism, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic
/479643/protectionism, archived at http://perma.cc/3PK6-CQKK (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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The first motivation is creating and nurturing a new industry in a country,
usually a developing nation trying to create a new source of prosperity
and jobs.24 This is a likely motivation for India and its Solar Mission, as
the program indicates that promoting “manufacturing in the solar sector
in India” is one of its goals.25 The second protectionist motivation, possibly
the position of the United States for its measures against Chinese solar
panels, is protecting an existing domestic industry from foreign competi-
tion. There are certainly American groups and interests that want the
United States to remain a leader in solar technology manufacturing.26
Again, these considerations of motives for violating WTO agreements dem-
onstrate how the solar manufacturing industry is considered worth pro-
tecting for countries that have it, and worth developing for those that do
not. The cost, however, for these measures is that solar technology is not
as economical as it should be.
Just as the motives for violating international trade agreements
can vary, the methods by which a country does so are equally numerous.
Excessive or uneven tariffs and import quotas or restrictions only scratch
the surface of possible scenarios leading to WTO disputes. For the pur-
poses of this Note, however, only two measures, domestic content re-
quirements and countervailing duties, are relevant to India and China’s
respective cases.
B. National Treatment
In the context of international trade, national treatment refers to
laws, regulations or other government measures that discriminate against
imports once they have cleared a country’s customs.27 Such measures pro-
vide either incentives for consumers and businesses to favor domestic
products over imports, or disincentives for the consumption of imports,
adversely affecting competition in the market for these products.28 In ef-
fect, post-importation discrimination undermines any benefits a trade
concession (e.g., reducing or eliminating the tariff on that product) would
grant that imported product;29 what good is a reduced tariff on solar panels
24 Id.
25 MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 12, at 2.
26 E.g., Dave Johnson, America Deserves A Solar Manufacturing Industry, CAMPAIGN FOR
AMERICA’S FUTURE (Aug. 16, 2013) http://ourfuture.org/20130816/america-deserves-a
-solar-manufacturing-industry, archived at http://perma.cc/ST67-D2E4.
27 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 142.
28 Id. at 143.
29 Id. at 142.
794 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:789
if the importing country enacts laws that would directly make its citizens
only want to buy domestic panels?
Domestic content requirements are a self-explanatory example of
national treatment, where a government requires businesses to acquire
a percentage or all of its materials or equipment from domestic suppliers
or manufacturers.30 Firms must meet these domestic requirements if they
want the government to grant them access to special subsidies, contracts,
or even to the market itself.31 The result of domestic content requirements
is a chilling effect not only on importation, but also on foreign investment.32
In other words, domestic content requirements make consumers less likely
to buy imports, foreign producers less likely to send imports to the coun-
try, and disincentivize foreign businesses from investing in countries
where they won’t have the freedom to choose the suppliers they prefer. To
prevent such adverse economic effects, the WTO generally prohibits domes-
tic content requirements through agreements such as TRIMS and SCM.33
C. Dumping
While neither of the cases pertains to dumping per se, dumping
is closely related to countervailing duties, and thus merits a brief descrip-
tion. The U.S. Tariff Act defines dumping as “the sale or likely sale of
goods at less than fair value.”34 In other words, dumping occurs when
exporters charge less for their products abroad than they would charge
in-country.35 This is not to say that imports cannot be cheaper than do-
mestic products. To use a hypothetical, if Country A is rich in the raw mate-
rials needed to make wind turbines, then manufacturers in Country A
are free to make their turbines cheaply, and pass the savings on to buyers
in Country B, who don’t have the same natural resources as Country A.
On the other hand, if Country A has no particular conditions that make
wind turbine manufacturing less costly than in Country B, and turbine
30 Domestic Content Requirements, ENCYCLOPEDIA WORLD ECONOMY (Sept. 12, 2011,
3:14 PM) http://world-economics.org/89-domestic-content-requirements.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/9XJL-HH87.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.; Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
34 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2012).
35 Understanding The WTO: The Agreements: Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: con-
tingencies, etc., WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e
/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies, [hereinafter WTO: Antidumping], archived at http://perma.cc
/52GJ-9K9P.
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manufacturers simply discount the turbines they export to Country B,
that would be dumping. The concern of countries importing dumped prod-
ucts is that the exporter is dumping in order to undercut domestic manu-
facturers and drive them out of the market. Once they have eliminated
domestic competition, the exporter is then free to charge whatever they
want for their product.36
D. Countervailing Duties
The major difference between dumping and countervailing subsidies
is where this “discount” comes from. In antidumping the manufacturer
lowers the export price on their own initiative, possibly taking a loss, pre-
sumably to corner the foreign market in their product. In countervailing
duties, the manufacturer’s home government grants them a subsidy for ex-
ports, and the manufacturers pass the savings onto the consumers abroad.
Countervailing duties arise from subsidies on exports, which is
itself inconsistent with international trade obligations, particularly under
the SCM Agreement.37 When an exporting country gives prohibited sub-
sidies to an industry that hurts an importing country’s industry, the im-
porting country has two options. The importing country can either file a
complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and let a panel decide,
or it can act unilaterally by imposing a countervailing duty.38 This coun-
tervailing duty is an extra tariff that cancels out the financial advantage
of the exporting country’s subsidy.39
Again, a hypothetical example can help to illustrate and clarify this
doctrine. The government of Country A gives monetary subsidies to its
domestic green industry, so that merchants can sell wind turbines from
A in Country B for less than similar turbines produced in B cost. As a re-
sult, A turbines out-compete B turbines, at least in terms of price. To re-
spond to these measures by Country A, the government of Country B has
two options; it can either take Country A through the WTO dispute settle-
ment process to have the subsidies declared illegal, or counteract the
effect of A’s subsidy by increasing the tariff duty on A’s turbines so they
cost about the same as B turbines.
When an importing country chooses the unilateral path, that is, im-
posing countervailing duties, it must do so in accordance with procedures
36 Id.
37 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 445.
38 Id. at 443.
39 Id.
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laid out in Part V of the SCM, which specifies that it must also follow Ar-
ticle IV of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT
1994”).40 This Note will discuss these provisions in more detail below. For
now, it is sufficient to say that failure to follow these procedures will con-
stitute a violation of international trade agreements, and the subsidizing
country can then challenge the countervailing duties before the WTO.41
To refer back to the wind turbine example, if Country B imposes a
countervailing duty on Country A’s turbines improperly (e.g., they failed
to investigate to determine whether a subsidy was actually harming their
domestic green industry),42 Country A can initiate a dispute settlement
case with the WTO DSB.
If Country A prevails, then Country B will have to stop the coun-
tervailing duties until it follows proper procedure. If Country B wins the
case, it is free to continue the countervailing duties until Country A stops
subsidizing wind turbines. In such a scenario, Country A would likely end
the subsidies quickly since, by virtue of Country B’s countervailing du-
ties, those subsidies become generous donations to the government of
Country B without any benefit to Country A’s turbine industry. The dis-
pute between China and the United States illustrates such a case, where
the United States has imposed countervailing duties against Chinese-
made solar panels and China contests the methods by which the United
States imposed them.
When a country chooses the “multilateral” path, it must redress
its grievance through the WTO dispute settlement process, which is the
subject of the following section.
E. WTO Dispute Settlement Process
1. Consultations
The dispute settlement process in the WTO has many discrete
steps, but in the simplest terms it is a two- or three-stage process (the
third step takes place only when a party appeals).43 The first stage is when
a country files a request for consultation with the offending party.44
40 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. I, III, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e
/subsidies_01_e.htm#top, [hereinafter SCM].
41 Id.
42 WTO: Antidumping, supra note 35.
43 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 493.
44 WTO: Antidumping, supra note 35; SCM, supra note 40, Part V.
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Strictly speaking, any WTO member can file against another member
allegedly not living up to its obligations; being an aggrieved party or having
an interest is not necessary to initiate WTO dispute proceedings.45 After
consultations begin, the two nations have sixty days to resolve the dispute
themselves.46 This is what happened in the dispute between the EU and
China over solar panel dumping.47 If initial consultations fail to produce
an acceptable solution for both parties, the countries can then request
the DSB to form a panel to decide the case.48
2. The WTO Panel
A dispute settlement panel is comprised of three members, or
five if both parties agree to expand the panel.49 These members must be
“well qualified” individuals, which the DSU defines as someone who has:
1) argued a case before a panel before; 2) served as a representative of a
Member country to the WTO or in a similar capacity; 3) “taught or pub-
lished on international trade law or policy”; or 4) “served as a senior trade
policy official of a Member.”50 Put simply, panelists are established ex-
perts in the field of international trade law. For obvious reasons, citizens
of the countries that are parties to the dispute cannot serve on that case’s
panel.51 These panelists act in their own capacity, not as representatives
of any country, and the panel only meets for the one case before them.52
Once the DSB establishes a panel, the two parties will argue
their cases before it in “meetings,” which are the functional equivalent of
hearings.53 The first meeting is where the parties present their initial
argument, with the complaining party going first, followed by a session set
aside for third-party members to submit their comments to the panel.54
Panelists at any time can ask the parties’ representatives questions to
45 Id.
46 A Unique Contribution, supra note 22.
47 Id.
48 Id.; see also Request for Consultations by China, supra note 13.
49 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, ¶132, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 25, 1997).
50 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20.
51 Chinese Solar Industry Gears up Following EU-China Deal, supra note 6.
52 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 4.7,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28
-dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU].
53 Id. at art. 8.5.
54 Id. at art. 8.1.
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clarify their positions.55 If the questions come before or after a scheduled
meeting, the questions and answers can be submitted in writing.56 After
the first meeting, the panel will convene a second meeting to hear the
parties’ rebuttals.57
Once the panel has held the necessary meetings and received
written submissions from all parties, the panel will then submit its ruling,
or report.58 After the panel submits its report, the parties have sixty days
to file notice to appeal the report, or the DSB will accept and adopt the
report, unless a consensus of DSB members decide not to adopt it.59
3. The Appellate Panel
One party or both parties can appeal the panel’s decisions.60 The
Appellate Body, unlike the panels, is a permanent body, with seven mem-
bers appointed for four-year terms.61 For a given case three members of
the Appellate Body review the legal rulings of the panel; factual findings
are not subject to appeal.62 After hearing the parties’ appellate argument,
the Appellate Body members issue their report, which the DSB will adopt
unless there is a consensus of members not to do so.63 Having some under-
standing of the procedure for trade disputes under the WTO, it is now
appropriate to look at each case in depth.
II. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL SOLAR MISSION:
UNITED STATES V. INDIA
A. Goals of JNNSM
In 2008, India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, unveiled eight
central “national missions” to combat climate change and global warming
as part of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (“NAPCC”).64 One
55 Id. at art. 8.3.
56 A Unique Contribution, supra note 22.
57 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 64.
58 DSU, supra note 52, at app. 3.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 DSU, supra note 52, at arts. 17.1–17.2.
62 Id. at arts. 17.1, 17.6.
63 Id. at arts. 17.9–17.14.
64 Summary: India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS (June 2008), http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/india
/climate-plan-summary, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8W6-V583.
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of the eight missions was the National Solar Mission, whose aim was “[t]o
promote the development and use of solar energy for power generation
and other uses with the ultimate objective of making solar competitive
with fossil-based energy options.”65 On inaugurating the program, Prime
Minister Singh said:
In this strategy, the sun occupies centre-stage, as it should,
being literally the original source of all energy. We will pool
our scientific, technical and managerial talents, with suf-
ficient financial resources, to develop solar energy as a
source of abundant energy to power our economy and to
transform the lives of our people.66
On January 11, 2010, the Indian government relaunched the solar
mission as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (“JNNSM”),
naming the program after the first Prime Minister of India.67
The prime objective of the JNNSM is to transform India into “a
global leader in solar energy,” by “creating the policy conditions for its dif-
fusion across the country as quickly as possible.”68 To this end the mis-
sion has three phases with set goals for each. Phase One took place from
2012–13, with a goal of increasing solar power capacity to 1,000 MW.69
The years 2014 to 2017 will comprise Phase Two, which will hopefully in-
crease that capacity to 10,000 MW.70 In Phase Three, from 2018 to 2022,
administrators hope to “learn” from the progress of the last two phases
and use that knowledge to increase the total capacity to 20,000 MW.71
In addition to getting more solar energy on the Indian grid, the
JNNSM has the goal of making India “a leadership role in low-cost, high
65 Id.
66 Mission Document, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://www.mnre.gov.in
/solar-mission/jnnsm/mission-document-3/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/Z5JM-TEJV.
67 Scheme/Documents, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://www.mnre.gov
.in/solar-mission/jnnsm/introduction-2/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015), archived at http://perma
.cc/9UZF-V25X
68 Resolution, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://www.mnre.gov.in/solar
-mission/jnnsm/resolution-2/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T6VT
-N93A.
69 MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, GOV. OF INDIA, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL
SOLAR MISSION, TOWARDS BUILDING SOLAR INDIA, available at http://www.mnre.gov.in
/file-manager/UserFiles/mission_document_JNNSM.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
70 Id.
71 Id.
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quality solar manufacturing,” citing India’s current dependence on foreign
sources of imported material and solar components.72 To that end, the
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (“MNRE”) requires that all solar
projects use solar cells and modules from Indian manufacturers.73
Phase One initially permitted projects to use foreign modules with
concentrator photovoltaic cells or thin-film technology,74 but for Phase Two,
the MNRE will require that new projects get those components domesti-
cally as well.75 The original exemption of thin-film solar panels actually
benefitted the industry in the United States, as American manufacturers
supplied the bulk of thin-film technology to India.76 Specifically, the United
States’s solar industry exported 75,582 peak kilowatts’ worth of thin-film
modules, accounting for almost ninety three percent of total solar module
exports to India.77 Clearly, it would be a serious loss for the American
solar industry if Indian solar projects had to purchase their thin-film
modules in-country.
B. United States Claim
On February 6, 2013, as a result of JNNSM’s domestic content
requirement, representatives from the United States filed a request for con-
sultation with India’s representatives, initiating the WTO dispute settle-
ment process.78 The primary charge against India is that the JNNSM’s
domestic content requirement is “inconsistent” with Article III, paragraph 4
of GATT 1994.79 This GATT provision deals directly with the issue of na-
tional treatment, requiring that products from another “contracting party”
are “accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like prod-
ucts of national origin.”80 To clarify, a contracting party in WTO documents
72 Id. at 5.
73 MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 12, at 7–8.
74 Id. at 8.
75 Amiti Sen & Richa Mishra, Local Sourcing Mandatory in Phase II of Solar Projects, THE
HINDU BUS. LINE (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-econ
omy/local-sourcing-mandatory-in-phase-ii-of-solar-projects/article5254566.ece, archived
at http://perma.cc/Z77F-WBZX.
76 Jasmeet Khurana, Weekly Update: U.S. Takes India to WTO Against Domestic Content
Requirement, BRIDGE TO INDIA BLOG, http://bridgetoindia.com/blog/?p=1454 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015).
77 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELL/MODULE SHIPMENTS REPORT
2011, at 12 (2012), available at http://www.photon.de/newsletter/document/70166.pdf.
78 Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 13.
79 Id. at 2.
80 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs art. III:4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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means a country that is a member of the WTO. In other words, Article III,
paragraph 4 forbids governments of WTO countries from passing any
measure that places more restrictions on imported products than on similar
domestic products, or requiring the use of domestic products over imports.
To the delegation from the United States, the JNNSM’s requirement
that projects use only solar panels manufactured in India constitutes
“less favorable treatment” of foreign-made solar panels.81 This matters
to the United States solar industry, since India is a major customer for
American solar technology, having purchased 81,310 peak kilowatts worth
of solar modules, or 10.24% of America’s exports, in 2011.82 This makes
India the fifth largest importer of the United States’ solar modules, after
Germany, Canada, Italy, and France.83 Other solar exporters, namely
Japan and Australia, are concerned with India’s differential treatment of
imported solar panels, and have joined the case with the United States.84
In addition to violating the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the JNNSM’s domestic content requirement violates several pro-
visions of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(“SCM”).85 Article 3.1(b) of SCM specifically prohibits WTO members from
conditioning government subsidies “upon the use of domestic over im-
ported goods.”86 This provision supplements GATT Art. III paragraph four,
in that it enjoins countries from offering financial incentives to favor
domestic products over imports, in addition to GATT’s prohibition of un-
fair restraints. Article 3.2 buttresses this provision, stating that “[a] Mem-
ber shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to” in Article 3.1.87
In India’s case, the subsidy in question is the government’s guarantee to
buy solar power at a high rate if the participating projects procure their
solar modules from Indian manufacturers.88
In the alternative, the United States asserts that the JNNSM’s
tying of subsidies to the domestic requirement violates Article 5(c), 6.3(a),
81 Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
82 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 77, at Table 9.
83 Id.
84 Request to Join Consultations: Communication from Japan, India—Certain Measures
Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/2 (Feb. 15 2013); Request to Join
Consultations: Communication from Australia, India—Certain Measures Relating to
Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/3 (Feb. 25 2013).
85 Request for consultations by the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
86 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 3.1.
87 Id. at art. 3.2.
88 United States Challenges India’s Restrictions on U.S. Solar Exports, OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REP. (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/034013
%20December%20Enforcement.pdf.
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and 6.3(c) of the SCM.89 Article 5(c) prohibits otherwise legal subsidies
that cause “adverse effects to the interests of another Member,” including
causing “serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.”90 Article
6 defines serious prejudice in the context of Article 5. The United States
delegates look to paragraph 3 of Article 6, which states:
Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5
may arise in any case where one or several of the following
apply:
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the
imports of a like product of another Member into the
market of the subsidizing Member;
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the
exports of a like product of another Member from a
third country market;
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price under-
cutting by the subsidized product as compared with
the price of a like product of another Member in the
same market or significant price suppression, price
depression or lost sales in the same market;
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world
market share of the subsidizing Member in a partic-
ular subsidized primary product or commodity (17)
as compared to the average share it had during the
previous period of three years and this increase fol-
lows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies
have been granted.91
In other words, a subsidy that would otherwise be permissible under the
SCM will count as causing “serious prejudice” if it causes any of these four
conditions. The United States refers specifically to sections (a) and (c),
which identify displacement of imported products and price cutting, respec-
tively, as conditions of serious prejudice caused by India.92 Given that India
89 Request for consultations by the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
90 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 5(c).
91 Id. at art. 6.3.
92 Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
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accounts for ten percent of the United States’ exports of solar modules,93
it would be plausible to assert that a subsidy requiring solar projects not
to buy thin-film panels from American manufacturers would cause dis-
placement of American solar products, resulting in serious prejudice.
C. India’s Response
India has indicated that it will contest the United States’s claim
that the domestic requirement violates its trade obligations. Anand
Sharma, India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, told then-Secretary
of Commerce John Bryson, “We . . . do not view the domestic sourcing
clause as violative of WTO rules . . . We have no plan of amending the
clause.”94 Specifically, India asserts that the Solar Mission falls under the
government procurement exception. Government procurement in interna-
tional trade means that governments are allowed to procure products ex-
clusively in-country for their own use.95 GATT Article 8(a) articulates
this rule in saying that government agencies can favor domestic goods
when purchasing them for “government purposes, and not with a view to
commercial resale.”96 The policy of this provision rests on the notion that
when a government entity purchases goods for its own use it is not acting
as a market regulator, but as a consumer, and therefore should be free to
set its own criteria for doing business.
For India, the claim is that the National Thermal Power Corpora-
tion (“NTPC”), a state-run power supplier, buys the power from JNNSM
solar projects, and the program thus qualifies as government procure-
ment.97 Therefore the government procurement principle allows India to
condition participation in the Solar Mission on using exclusively India-
made solar panels.98 There is a WTO Government Procurement Agreement
(“GPA”), in which signees agree to not discriminate between domestic and
93 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 77, at Table 9.
94 Amiti Sen, ‘Domestic Sourcing for Solar Mission No Violation of WTO Rules’, THE ECON.
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2012), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-04-09/news/3131
3157_1_national-solar-mission-solar-power-vidyut-vyapar-nigam, [hereinafter Domestic
Sourcing], archived at http://perma.cc/Y8K9-Y8VN.
95 Amiti Sen, India to Defend Local-buy Policy in Solar Mission as US, EU Protest, THE
ECON. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-02-03/news
/31021273_1_solar-mission-trade-related-investment-measures-solar-energy, [hereinafter
India to Defend], archived at http://perma.cc/U37J-2W43.
96 GATT, supra note 80, at art. III:8(a).
97 Domestic Sourcing, supra note 94.
98 India to Defend, supra note 95.
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imported products in government procurement. India, however, has not
signed the GPA, which is not mandatory for WTO members, and is there-
fore not bound to abide by it.99
III. UNITED STATES—COUNTERVAILING DUTY MEASURES ON SOLAR
PANELS FROM CHINA
A. Department of Commerce’s Application of Countervailing Duties
US—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China began when SolarWorld Industries America, Inc. filed a petition with
the Department of Commerce (“DOC”) on October 19, 2011.100 The pe-
tition asked the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), the branch of
DOC that handles the international trade issues of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties,101 to investigate whether countervailing duties would
be appropriate against China’s “unfairly traded” crystalline silicon solar
panels.102 SolarWorld alleged that Chinese manufacturers of solar panels
were benefitting from subsidies from the Chinese government, and as a
result these subsidies were causing “material injury” to the American
solar industry.103
The material injury in this instance was a sudden and dramatic
increase in solar panel imports from China, from 3.8 million units to 17.4
million units from 2008 to 2010.104 These importation figures accelerated
even further in 2011 with numbers for the first eight months reaching
44.6 million units, and SolarWorld predicted that the total number for the
year would reach 66.8 million units.105 With these figures demonstrating
how overwhelmingly Chinese imports were penetrating and surging the
United States market for solar panels, SolarWorld asserted that Chinese
exporters threatened the domestic solar industry in the United States.106
99 Id.
100 Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From
the People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 70966 (Nov. 16, 2011).
101 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 99.
102 Letter from Timothy C. Brightbill, Gen. Counsel, SolarWorld Indus. Am. Inc., to The
Honorable Rebecca M. Blank, Acting Sec’y of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce on Pe-
tition for the Imposition of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Against Crystalline
Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.troutmansanders.com
/files/upload/Crystalline_Petition_Vol1.pdf, [hereinafter Petition for Countervailing Duties].
103 Id. at 25.
104 Id. at 50.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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This was all under the auspices of section 731 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1673,107 which states,
If—
(1) the administering authority determines that a class
or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely
to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, and
(2) the Commission determines that—
(A) an industry in the United States—
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material
injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in
the United States is materially re-
tarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise or
by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales)
of that merchandise for importation,
then there shall be imposed upon such mer-
chandise an antidumping duty, in addition
to any other duty imposed, in an amount
equal to the amount by which the normal
value exceeds the export price (or the con-
structed export price) for the merchandise.
For purposes of this section and section
1673d (b)(1) of this title, a reference to the
sale of foreign merchandise includes the en-
tering into of any leasing arrangement re-
garding the merchandise that is equivalent
to the sale of the merchandise.108
In other words, if ITC investigates and discovers that foreign manufac-
turers are selling their products in the United States for less than the
“fair value” of the products, and American manufacturers suffer as a result,
then ITC can direct Customs to charge an additional tariff to negate the
price difference. This is antidumping, where the motive or the source of
the lower prices is not relevant.
107 Id. at 1.
108 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
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Furthermore, SolarWorld alleged that Chinese manufacturers of
solar panels received subsidies from the Chinese government for exporting
their products, in particular by providing raw materials to solar manu-
facturers for “less than adequate remuneration,”109 or in other words, at
drastically reduced price, possibly for less than cost. SolarWorld listed
other subsidies in the petition as well, including preferential loans, export
financing, subsidized export insurance, and other potential government
directed capital infusions.110
The United States government could counteract these subsidies
under section 701 of the Tariff Act, codified under 19 U.S.C. § 1671.111 This
section pertains directly to countervailing duties. Subsection (a) of sec-
tion 701 states:
If—
(1) the administering authority determines that the
government of a country or any public entity within
the territory of a country is providing, directly or in-
directly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to
the manufacture, production, or export of a class or
kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be
sold) for importation, into the United States, and
(2) in the case of merchandise imported from a Sub-
sidies Agreement country, the Commission deter-
mines that—
(A) an industry in the United States—
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material in-
jury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in
the United States is materially re-
tarded, by reason of imports of that
merchandise or by reason of sales (or
the likelihood of sales) of that mer-
chandise for importation, then there
shall be imposed upon such merchan-
dise a countervailing duty, in addi-
tion to any other duty imposed, equal
109 Petition for Countervailing Duties, supra note 102, at 45.
110 Id. at 45–46.
111 Id. at 1.
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to the amount of the net counter-
vailable subsidy.112
The language in this provision is very similar to 19 U.S.C. § 1673, except
that the cause for the foreign manufacturer’s selling exports at lower
prices must be due to that manufacturer receiving subsidies from the
government.113 Under § 1671 (2), the country must be a Subsidies Agree-
ment country, otherwise DOC does not need to determine whether any
injury to American manufacturers has occurred.114 The following subsec-
tion of 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (b), defines a Subsidy Agreement country, among
other possible criteria, as a WTO member.115
To return to the wind turbine illustration discussed above, under
these statutes, an American manufacturer must petition DOC to determine
whether unfair trade practices have taken place in Country A’s exportation
of wind turbines. To find that dumping has occurred under the Tariff Act
section 731, DOC must find that Country A is selling its turbines in the
United States for less than “fair value,” and that this practice is injuring
American wind turbine manufacturers, or likely to injure them. To im-
pose countervailing duties under section 701, DOC must first find that
Country A’s government gives subsidies to export the wind turbines. Then
the question is whether Country A is a Subsidies Agreement country,
whether as a WTO member or through some other agreement. If so, then
DOC must then determine if Country B’s subsidies cause an injury to
American manufacturers before imposing additional import duties. If not,
DOC does not have to make a determination of the injury to American
manufacturers and can levy the countervailing tariff duties without
showing injury.
In the present case, the People’s Republic of China is a WTO
member, having acceded to the organization on December 11, 2001.116
Therefore, DOC would have to establish that subsidies from the Chinese
government to exporters of solar panels caused an injury to American
manufacturers before they could impose countervailing duties.117 And so
112 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
113 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
114 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a),(c).
115 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b).
116 Understanding the WTO: The Organization Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/ANK5-3WKY.
117 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 76 Fed. Reg. 70960, 70968
(Nov. 16, 2011).
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on November 8, 2011, the International Trade Commission commenced an
investigation into solar cells imported from China for the calendar year
2010.118 In addition, ITC had consultations with representatives from
China to discuss the matter.119
The definition for subsidies for the purposes of countervailing
duties lies in 19 U.S.C. § 1677, which states:
A subsidy is described in this paragraph in the case in
which an authority—
(i) provides a financial contribution,
(ii) provides any form of income or price
support within the meaning of Article XVI
of the GATT 1994, or
(iii) makes a payment to a funding mecha-
nism to provide a financial contribution, or
entrusts or directs a private entity to make
a financial contribution, if providing the con-
tribution would normally be vested in the
government and the practice does not differ
in substance from practices normally fol-
lowed by governments,
to a person and a benefit is thereby conferred. For purposes
of this paragraph and paragraphs (5A) and (5B), the term
“authority” means a government of a country or any public
entity within the territory of the country.120
In addition,§ 1677characterizes providing manufacturers with materials
with less than adequate remuneration as a government-provided financial
contribution with conferring a benefit.121 In the case of Chinese solar
panels, SolarWorld’s petition claimed that the polysilicon industry selling
products to solar manufacturers (for less than adequate remuneration)
were owned by the Chinese government.122 DOC then tried to determine
whether these polysilicon manufacturers were state-owned. To each man-
ufacturer that the Chinese government claimed was a private entity DOC
sent a request for information, including documents that demonstrate the
118 Notice of Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 76 Fed. Reg. 70960 (Nov. 16,
2011).
119 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, supra note 117, at 70967.
120 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B).
121 19 U.S.C § 1667(5)(D), (E).
122 Petition for Countervailing Duties, supra note 102, at 45.
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company’s ownership for 2010, identification of the owners’ board members,
or managers who were also government officials or officers of the Chinese
Communist Party, information as to whether the company had ever been
a state-owned entity, and information as to whether and how operational
or strategic decisions made by the company were subject to government
review or approval.123 The Chinese government was less forthcoming than
DOC wanted, and the polysilicon producers provided practically no in-
formation as to the extent, past or present, of government control of their
respective enterprises.124
On March 26, 2012, the International Trade Administration
released its preliminary findings.125 Because the Chinese producers of
polysilicon and the government in Beijing did not give DOC the informa-
tion regarding ownership and control, and according to DOC, “impeded
the investigation,” DOC had to apply the adverse inference doctrine.126
In other words, since the Chinese failed (possibly deliberately) to provide
the necessary information to prove otherwise, DOC could assume that the
polysilicon producers were state-owned and controlled. So they did, holding
that the polysilicon manufacturers were “authorities” for the purposes of
19 U.S.C. § 1677.127
Furthermore, DOC found that certain solar panel manufacturers
in China had also received real estate from the government for less than
adequate remuneration.128 Under § 771(5)(D)(iii) of the Tariff Act, favor-
able land grants would count as a financial contribution, and thus as a
subsidy.129 The Chinese government claimed that the local authorities,
rather than the national government, set the prices of real estate and
land rights.130
When DOC requested further information from Beijing regarding
the processes by which solar manufacturers bought their land, however,
the Chinese government provided information for only one parcel of land.131
Again, DOC determined that the Chinese government failed to cooperate
123 Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 Fed. Ref.
17439 (Mar. 26, 2012).
124 Id. at 17443.
125 Id. at 17439.
126 Id. at 17444.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 17451.
129 Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, supra note 123,
at 17451.
130 Id. at 17444.
131 Id.
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and provide the necessary information, which was inconsistent with
China’s past ability to provide similar information in prior cases.132
Therefore DOC believed that finding an adverse inference was justified,
and ruled that the land grants to certain Chinese solar manufacturers
were directly tied to their industry, and thus qualified as a countervail-
able subsidy.133
The Chinese government characterizes this procedure in their filing
with the WTO as a “rebuttable presumption” established and applied by
DOC.134 It even refers to the Federal Regulations (63 Fed. Reg. 65,348,
to be specific) to say that this assessment is a rebuttable presumption.135
However, the same portion of the Federal Register makes a distinction be-
tween “adverse facts available” analyses and “rebuttable presumptions.”136
Nonetheless, the Chinese delegation maintains that this system considers
majority government ownership of an enterprise sufficient to determine
that an enterprise is a “public body” within the meaning of Article 1.1 of
the SCM Agreement.137
B. China’s Claims
China claims that DOC’s procedure for establishing countervailable
duties is inconsistent with a number of the United States’ international
trade obligations.138 The first of these is Article VI of the GATT 1994; this
is the general provision regarding dumping and countervailing duties. The
relevant provision of Article VI for China is the third paragraph, which
prohibits countries from charging countervailing duties “in excess of an
amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been
granted” to the industry.139 To determine how DOC’s countervailable du-
ties specifically violate Article VI, it would serve to determine how the
duties allegedly violate other trade agreements.
132 Id. at 17444–45.
133 Id. at 17445.
134 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16.
135 Id.
136 E.g., Dep’t of Commerce Int’l Trade of Commerce, 19 C.F.R. pt 351 (1998)(“If a
respondent refuses to provide the information requested by the Department to conduct
its specificity analysis, we may draw adverse inferences in the application of ‘facts avail-
able.’ . . . However, the use of an adverse inference in these situations is not the same
thing as relying on a rebuttable presumption of specificity.”).
137 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16, at 2.
138 Id.
139 GATT, supra note 80, at Art. VI:3.
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The Chinese delegation then alleged that DOC’s measures were
inconsistent with the SCM agreement.140 The focal provisions for the
purposes of this Note are in the first two articles, relating to the definition
of a subsidy and whether a subsidy is specific to an industry.141 Article 1
identifies a subsidy where “there is a financial contribution by a govern-
ment or any public body,” including, inter alia, when “a government pro-
vides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases
goods.”142 In particular, China challenges DOC’s determination that the
goods the Chinese solar manufacturers received, such as polysilicon and
real estate, came from a “public body” within the SCM’s definition.143 Spe-
cifically, China asserts that DOC “incorrectly determined, or did not have
a sufficient basis to determine, that certain [state-owned enterprises] are
‘public bodies’ within the meaning of” Article 1.144
China then looks to Article 2 which provides a method for determi-
nation as to whether a subsidy is specific to an industry. The first two sub-
sections of Article 2 concern circumstances where the government directly
specifies the industry to which subsidies will go, or specifies criteria which
will make industries eligible for the subsidy.145 Where specific evidence
to determine whether these two subsections apply is absent, subsection (c)
provides an attrape-tout for circumstances that indicate specificity.146
DOC did not use any of these criteria in determining specificity
with regards to the Chinese solar panels. Having found the Chinese gov-
ernment uncooperative in providing information, DOC had determined
specificity through “adverse inference”.147 In claiming that DOC “failed to
make a proper determination on the basis of positive evidence” that the
alleged subsidies were specific to the Chinese solar industry,148 the Chinese
delegation challenges the use of adverse inference to determine specificity.
The Chinese government then challenged DOC’s application of
countervailing measures against the Chinese solar industry. Article 10
140 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16, at 2.
141 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 1,2.
142 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
143 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16.
144 Id.
145 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 2(a)–(b).
146 LAROUSEE FRENCH DICTIONARY, available at http://translate.google.com/translate?hl
=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/attrape-tout/6314&prev=search
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (“Describes a product that seeks to please the greatest number
of consumers.”), archived at http://perma.cc/JZ7K-YDKL.
147 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 2.1(c).
148 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, supra note 117, at 70970.
812 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:789
of the SCM requires that countries impose countervailing duties pursuant
to an investigation of countervailable subsidies that conforms to GATT
and SCM requirements.149 It would therefore be China’s contention that,
in failing to conduct its investigation into Chinese solar panels consistent
with its trade obligations, DOC failed to apply countervailing measures
in accordance with the SCM.
The Chinese delegation highlights its allegation that DOC has
improperly initiated its investigation, looking to Article 11 of the SCM.150
The delegation specifically looked to sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article 11, to
claim that SolarWorld’s petition to DOC failed to provide sufficient evidence
or facts for DOC to initiate the investigation in Chinese solar panels.151
Section 1 simply mandates that DOC (or any government body) initiate
countervailable subsidy investigations after receiving “a written applica-
tion by or on behalf of the domestic industry.”152 SolarWorld’s petition ob-
viously satisfies the requirement of the first section, so that section alone
does not support China’s allegations.
However, section 2 provides required elements that the domestic
industry (in this case, SolarWorld) must include in its petition.153 Such
elements include, inter alia, a “complete description of the allegedly subsi-
dized product” and its country of origin, and evidence of the subsidy and
its injury to the domestic industry.154 Section 3 requires the governing au-
thority (e.g., the U.S. Department of Commerce) to review the evidence
provided in the petition to determine if the evidence is accurate and sup-
ports initiating an investigation.155 Again, SolarWorld’s petition provides
the evidence required by section 2;156 whether or not the facts and evi-
dence are accurate, the petition satisfies this provision of the SCM. As for
DOC’s examination of SolarWorld’s allegations, it will probably fall to the
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel to determine whether they properly fol-
lowed Article 11.3 of the SCM before initiating their investigation.
The Chinese delegation then looks to section 7 of Article 12 to as-
sert that the DOC has improperly used adverse inference in reaching its
determination of subsidies and injury to the domestic solar industry.157
149 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16.
150 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 10.
151 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16, at 2.
152 Id. at 2–3.
153 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 11.1.
154 Id.
155 Id. at art. 11.3.
156 Petition for Countervailing Duties, supra note 102, at i–iii.
157 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16, at 4.
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Article 12.7 states that, when a country investigating dumping or coun-
tervailable subsidies requests information from “any interested Member
[i.e., country] or interested party [i.e., exporter or supplier to exporters],”
and those entities refuse or otherwise fail to provide the requested
information, the investigating country may proceed and base its determi-
nations on “facts available.”158 The language of this provision specifically
allows a government authority like DOC to use “facts available” when
parties like the Chinese government fail to provide the necessary infor-
mation to determine whether or not unfair trading practices have taken
place. The Chinese delegation most likely distinguishes “facts available”
from “adverse inference” as DOC uses the term, as this Note will discuss
in the section predicting the outcome of these trade disputes.
Finally, the Chinese delegation refers to several articles of the SCM,
as well as the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China,
to assert that DOC used improper methods to determine the amount of
the alleged subsidy and thus to impose its countervailing tariff.159 These
articles include Articles 14 and 32 of the SCM, and Article 15 of the
Protocol.160 The Protocol is the document by which China joined the WTO
on December 11, 2001.161 As this Note prefers to focus on the allegations
that DOC improperly used adverse inference to determine that counter-
vailable subsidies had taken place, the description of calculating subsidies
will be as brief as possible.
Article 14 states, in relevant part, that government provision of
goods does not constitute a subsidy unless the government furnished them
“less than adequate remuneration.”162 The provision does not specify
what adequate remuneration is, but does require that the deciding gov-
erning body base that determination “in relation to prevailing market con-
ditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision.”163
In other words, the body investigating alleged subsidies must compare the
price paid by the manufacturer to the government for the goods to the price
those goods normally have in that country at the time the manufacturer
received them.
In US—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, the case is more complicated in that China has special circumstance
158 SCM, supra note 40, at art. 12.7.
159 Request for consultation by China, supra note 16, at 2.
160 Id.
161 WORLD TRADE ORG., China and the WTO: Member information, http://www.wto.org
/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/QLL6-2X48.
162 See SCM, supra note 40, at art. 14(d).
163 Id.
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when determining the domestic price of goods. As a non-market economy
(i.e., communist), the WTO recognizes that China might artificially set
the domestic prices for goods such as polysilicon glass.164 As such, Article 15
of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China provides
special conditions for price comparison. When comparing prices of Chinese
goods, a governing body like DOC can either use the actual price in China,
or an alternative basis that “is not based on a strict comparison with do-
mestic prices or costs in China.”165 Generally, the governing body must use
the actual price in China if the interested manufacturers can show that
the price of the goods in China actually reflect the market, and may use an
alternate method if the producer cannot show that Chinese prices are
based on market conditions.166 China’s contention in US—Countervailing
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China is that DOC failed to act
in accordance with these provisions in the SCM and the Protocol to deter-
mine that Chinese solar industries received polysilicon glass for less than
adequate remuneration.167
IV. PREDICTIONS OF THE OUTCOMES
A. India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules
There are numerous factors to consider when predicting the outcome
of India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules.
To establish a prima facie case against India, the United States will have
to demonstrate that its allegations in its Request for Consultations are fac-
tual. Specifically, the United States will have to prove that the JNNSM
afford imported solar cells and solar modules less favorable treatment than
to those manufactured in India, specifically by providing grants contingent
upon the use of Indian solar panels.168 These allegations should not prove
difficult to establish, as India apparently stipulates to their accuracy.
India can stipulate to the United States’ prima facie case, because
they claim to be exempt under the government procurement exception.169
164 See WORLD TRADE ORG., Technical Information on Anti-Dumping, http://www.wto.org
/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/93LK-Y5K8.
165 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, art. 15 (Nov. 23,
2001).
166 Id.
167 See Request for consultation by China, supra note 16, at 2.
168 See Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 13, at 48.
169 See Sen, India to Defend, supra note 95.
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Again, this is on the grounds that NTPC, which purchases the solar power
from approved projects, is a state-owned company.170 The dispositive
question then appears to be whether India can properly claim that govern-
ment procurement permits the program as it stands.
The best method for predicting the outcome of this case, as well
as that of US—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, is to consult prior WTO dispute resolution reports. Canada—
Measures Relating to the Feed—In Tariff Program (DS426) is a case that
would be very helpful for predicting how a panel would rule on India’s
JNNSM, for two reasons. First, the appellate body issued its report on the
case in May of 2013,171 so it is sufficiently recent to gauge the current at-
titudes toward national treatment and government procurement. Second,
the facts of the Canadian case correlate fairly well to the facts in India—
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules.
Canada had initiated a feed-in tariff (“FIT”) program to implement
the Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009.172 In general terms,
the FIT program had the Ontario Power Authority, a state-run power com-
pany, contract with generators of wind and solar electricity to buy electric-
ity at an above-market price fixed for twenty years.173 Like the JNNSM,
the Canadian FIT program required that contracting suppliers acquire
their green generating equipment from Canadian manufacturers.174
Japan and the European Community (“EC”) challenged this pro-
gram as inconsistent with Canada’s trade obligations.175 Canada cited
Article III:8(a) to claim that the FIT program was exempt from national
treatment as a procurement by a government agency.176 The initial panel
concluded that Canada’s FIT program concerned the government procure-
ment of electricity, and therefore Canada could use Article III:8(a) as a
170 Id.
171 Relating to the Feed—In Tariff Program, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013), [hereinafter
Appellate Report-Canada].
172 Kenina Lee, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and A Sustainable Future? Eval-
uating the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with WTO
Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 57, 59 (2011).
173 Andrew Shoyer & Rajib Pal, Government Support For Green Energy: Is WTO Decision
a Game-Changer?, WHO’SWHOLEGAL, 1 (Dec. 2013), available at http://whoswholegal
.com/news/features/article/30990/, archived at http://perma.cc/FA4Q-KX4S.
174 Id.
175 Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector, WT/DS426/R, 5–6 (Dec. 19, 2012).
176 Id. at 56.
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defense.177 The panel found, however, that the program was inconsistent
with other trade obligations.178
Canada, Japan, and the European Commission appealed the deci-
sion to the Appellate Panel, which reviewed the FIT program under the
government procurement doctrine. The Appellate Panel found that the
FIT Program and related FIT contracts were not exempt under the govern-
ment procurement exemption in Article III:8(a) of the GATT. The reason
was that the Minimum Domestic Content Requirement, which applied
to private electricity generators, was too attenuated from the supposedly
permissible “government procurement” of electricity by the Canadian
government.179 To clarify, even if the Canadian government were buying
the electricity for its own use, there is no sufficient link between buying
electricity and requiring the third-party providers to use Canadian-made
equipment.
For India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules, this indicates that the dispute panel would likely find the JNNSM
not to be exempt from national treatment under Article III:8(a). First,
India would have to contend with the provision that the government
procurement not be with the intent to resell the power they acquire from
solar programs.180 As NTPC Limited is a major supplier of India’s power,
presumably to the general public as well as to the government,181 the Panel
would likely hold that the purpose of the Indian government buying the
electricity was to resell it. Moreover, if the Panel did not consider the
procurement as a reselling of the electricity, the Panel would likely hold
that the minimum domestic content provisions for private solar energy
suppliers was not sufficiently connected to government purchasing of elec-
tricity, as was the case in Canada. For the purposes of green energy pol-
icy, there is therefore no justification for requiring domestic panels if the
solar projects can acquire efficient units cheaply for foreign manufacturers.
B. China
In US—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, the dispositive question, at least for the purposes of this Note, is
177 Id. at 75.
178 Id. at 139.
179 Appellate Report-Canada, supra note 171, at 150.
180 GATT, supra note 80, at art. III:8(a).
181 NTPC, Overview, http://www.ntpc.co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=42&Itemid=75&lang=en, archived at http://perma.cc/LH5Y-JDHB.
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whether DOC’s use of adverse inference in making its preliminary deter-
minations was consistent with the United States’ trade obligations. To
that end, United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan would be a helpful case to gauge the WTO’s
attitude toward “adverse facts available,” the term used by the Panel which
is fairly synonymous with DOC’s “adverse inference”. Granted, US—Anti-
dumping Measures is an older case, handed down in 2001,182 and does not
deal directly with countervailing duties. It does, however, pertain to dump-
ing, which, as explained above, is closely related to countervailable sub-
sidies on exports. Moreover, US—Antidumping Measures concerns DOC’s
methodology, and can prove useful in guessing how a dispute panel would
address DOC’s methods for imposing countervailing tariffs against China.
In United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, DOC suspected that Japanese manufacturers
of hot-rolled steel, specifically Kawasaki Steel Corporation (“KSC”), Nippon
Steel Corporation (“NSC”), and NKK Corporation (“NKK”), were dumping
their products on the American market.183 As part of its investigation, DOC
asked KSC to provide the prices at which its American buyer resold its
products.184 Despite KSC’s willingness to comply, the American buyer
refused to furnish that information to KSC.185
KSC had the contractual right to compel its buyer to provide the
information, but chose not to exercise it.186 Nor did DOC take affirmative
steps to aid KSC in getting the information.187 Without this information,
DOC determined that KSC was not “fully cooperative and made every
effort to obtain and provide the information.”188 The eventual Appellate
Panel at the WTO held that DOC was unreasonable in expecting KSC to
exhaust all measure to obtain the information, without offering any help
on its part to obtain it directly from the importer.189 While DOC lost in
that case, it does not mean that DOC cannot use adverse facts available
at all. It would appear that, at a minimum, the WTO requires reasonable
accommodation on the part of an investigating authority like DOC before
they can resort to “adverse facts available.”
182 See Appellate Report, United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001).
183 Id. at 1.
184 Id. at 35.
185 Id. at 36.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Appellate Report, supra note 171, at 36 (citing Fed. Reg. 24329, 24368 (May 6, 1999)).
189 Id. at 41.
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The facts in United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan concerning KSC, however, contrast
those of the Chinese solar manufacturers. In its initial investigation, DOC
granted at least seven extensions to the Chinese solar manufacturers, as
well as to the Chinese government, with regard to filing responses to
DOC’s questionnaire.190 It would therefore appear that DOC was very
accommodating in requesting information from the Chinese parties. More-
over, there is no material in the Federal Record to indicate that these
parties faced any difficulties in locating or obtaining the requested informa-
tion, other than China’s assertion that no centralized database existed
that stored the information.191 On the contrary, the Chinese government
did not indicate at all what steps it had taken to find the information.192
Given DOC’s accommodations to the Chinese parties, along with China’s
failure to even indicate that it had taken reasonable steps to obtain the
requested information, the WTO dispute panel could find that the use of
adverse inference on the part of DOC was reasonable.
This question of using adverse inference or adverse facts available
may not be dispositive in this case as a whole. US—Countervailing Duty
Measures on Certain Products from China involves many issues, includ-
ing calculation of subsidies and the final investigation and determination
that DOC promulgated in December of 2012.193 This one issue of adverse
inference, however, illustrates the variety of problems that face interna-
tional trade, and by extension the market for green technology.
CONCLUSION
After this exhausting, if not exhaustive, look at the WTO dispute
process and these two cases, this Note finally turns to an important ques-
tion: why does all this domestic-content and countervailing duties nonsense
matter for environmental policy? On the face of it, the interests of inter-
national trade do not run parallel to the interest of environmental policy.
In fact, there is at least one voice that claims that international
trade law conflicts with environmental policy. Kenina Lee, in her article An
Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a Sustainable Future? Evaluating
the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with
190 77 F.R. 17439, 17740 (Mar. 26, 2012).
191 Id. at 17743.
192 Id.
193 See generally Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Mod-
ules, From the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 73017
(Dec. 7, 2012).
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WTO Trade Law, asserts that those interested in global climate policy
should look to multilateral agreements such as Kyoto Protocol and United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, rather than to the
WTO and GATT.194 Looking to Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In
Tariff Program, which she discussed in great detail and (correctly) pre-
dicted the outcome, Lee maintains that WTO decisions prohibiting domestic
content requirements impedes government programs to increase renew-
able energy output, such as Canada’s FIT program,195 or (by extension)
India’s JNNSM. However, she derives this inference from the assumption
that the domestic content requirements provide some environmental bene-
fit, as she believes that the cost of producing renewable energy will pro-
gressively decline from economies of scale.196 The point she misses is that
the cost decreases because of, rather than in spite of, international trade.
While it is true that a ruling against India will require a revision of
the Solar Mission, there is scarce evidence that it will make its implementa-
tion more difficult or expensive. On the contrary, the opposite is likely
true. If Indian solar panels are truly competitive in the global market, in
quality and price, then a domestic content requirement would be unnec-
essary. If, on the other hand, the Indian solar industry is fledgling and
cannot produce the required panels cheaply or efficiently, then a domes-
tic content requirement could threaten the efficacy of the entire Mission.
The same applies for the case of US—Countervailing Duty Measures
on Certain Products from China. As stated above, many factors could allow
the WTO panel to rule for or against the United States. However, a decision
in favor of DOC would not necessarily equate to a victory for American
solar power. Certain members of the American solar industry oppose
SolarWorld’s petition to DOC as “protectionist,” threatening the industry
as a whole.197 Whether DOC’s measures against Chinese solar panels are
protectionist, or legitimately aimed to curtail unfair trade practices by the
Chinese, is best left to a panel in the WTO, whose only interest is free and
open commerce.
If the WTO panel determines that the influx of cheap Chinese solar
panels is due to China’s staggering capacity for manufacturing and not
194 Kenina Lee, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and A Sustainable Future? Evalu-
ating the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with WTO
Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 57, 91 (2011).
195 Id. at 86.
196 Id. at 86–87.
197 See COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE SOLAR ENERGY, What is the Coalition for Affordable
Solar Energy? (2014), http://www.affordablesolarusa.org/about/, archived at http://perma
.cc/VKB8-5HWT.
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from unfair dumping or prohibited government subsidies, China should
then be free to out-compete American solar manufacturers. The lesson
then for China in this matter would be to cooperate with DOC and save
both governments the trouble of turning to the WTO.
If, however, China’s trade in solar panels is bolstered by unfair
trade practices (dumping or subsidies) then the WTO should make them
stop. Otherwise they will drive the domestic solar industries out of busi-
ness.198 If they did so, the Chinese would then control the market for solar
panels, and be free to raise the prices or lower the quality, as there would
be no competitor to challenge them.199 That, in turn, would reduce the
cost-effectiveness of green energy.
The best, if not only, way to ensure that solar energy can seriously
contend with fossil fuel-derived energy is to make it so that solar technology
is affordable, ideally at the lowest price possible. This is already a chal-
lenge, as solar energy currently costs between three to six times more to
produce than energy from conventional sources.200
WTO trade obligations, as expressed in agreements such as the
GATT and the SCM, ensure that countries will not give an unfair advan-
tage to their respective solar industries by freezing out foreign solar prod-
ucts, nor distort the market by granting unnecessary subsidies.201 This
makes for a global free market, which in turn means the lowest prices.202
In other words, those countries able to efficiently produce the best solar
components can do so unimpeded and reap the financial benefits, while
those countries that cannot can acquire solar technology elsewhere at the
lowest cost possible and reap the environmental benefits. In the end, the
whole world wins, both economically and environmentally.
198 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 445.
199 Id.
200 NAT’L ACAD. ENG’G, Make solar energy economical, NAE Grand Challenges for Engineer-
ing (2012), http://www.engineeringchallenges.org/cms/8996/9082.aspx, archived at http://
perma.cc/XK8E-87B9.
201 WORLD TRADE ORG., Understanding the WTO: What We Stand For, http://www.wto.org
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